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1 
The EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements with Africa: ‘Decent Work’ 
and the Challenge of Trade Union Solidarity 
Abstract 
The EU has in recent years adopted the International Labour Organisation’s Decent Work 
Agenda in its external trade and development policy. It is portrayed as a way to mitigate any 
negative impacts on labour. However, African trade unions have campaigned against the 
EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). It is argued that their stance highlights the 
limitations of incorporating the Decent Work Agenda into trade agreements, which instead 
are seen as central to the process of entrenching economic liberalisation. As a result, the 
article considers the prospects for transnational labour solidarity to resist EPAs. 
Keywords: ACP; labour; Southern Africa; trade and growth; neoliberalization 
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Introduction 
During the 1990s the EU and the US led an unsuccessful attempt to try and include labour 
standards into the multilateral rules on trade regulated by the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO).1 This was a campaign which was supported by the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). It was argued that nation-states were increasingly powerless to 
protect labour rights and therefore ‘the leadership of the ICFTU felt that...the only strategy 
left for labour was to try and make the existing international institutions as least harmful to 
labour as possible’.2 However, a number of trade union movements in the Global South were
critical of ICFTU’s support of this approach. Such divisions have continued to be apparent in 
the negotiation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and their potential to ensure core 
labour standards. 
This article considers how these tensions have played out in the case of the EU’s negotiation 
of PTAs with regions in the Global South. As the direction of EU trade policy has shifted 
towards bilateralism, so the inclusion of labour standards, and in particular the Decent Work 
Agenda as articulated by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), have featured 
increasingly prominently in its trade and development policy with African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) states. Van den Putte and Orbie describe how provisions on labour have 
featured particularly strongly in all the EU’s trade agreements since its first full Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the Caribbean (CARIFORUM) was agreed in 2008.3 The
specific focus of this article is the recently signed EPA between the EU and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), which is the first comprehensive EPA signed 
with a group of African states. 
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The rest of the article is organised as follows. In the next section I introduce the key aspects 
of the Decent Work Agenda. Here I demonstrate how it has become an increasingly central 
feature of the current global development orthodoxy, encapsulated most obviously in the 
recently agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). I then trace how this has been 
reflected in the EU’s trade and development policy. Here I argue that the inclusion of ‘decent 
work’ in recent trade agreements provides a rhetorical justification for an approach that 
actually reflects the interests of European capital. The focus then turns to the EPA 
negotiations between the EU and SADC. Here I outline how the labour movement, although 
it remains weak in many states across the region, has to varying degrees of intensity, pursued 
a strategy of resistance in response to the negotiation of an EPA. I also show how this critical 
stance taken by African trade unions in relation to EPAs has also been articulated at both the 
continental and regional levels. I then consider the prospects for transnational labour 
solidarity in response to the EU’s trade agenda and the SADC EPA in particular. I argue here 
that these prospects have been compromised in the past because the European labour 
movement has been more convinced by the significance of the inclusion of labour standards 
in trade agreements. Only in the last few years has it demonstrated both a more critical stance 
on EPAs and more explicit solidarity with the labour movement in Africa. The article then 
concludes by considering the options available to trade unions in how they respond to the 
inclusion of the Decent Work Agenda in PTAs. 
 
‘Decent Work’ and the global development orthodoxy 
 
Decent work has featured increasingly prominently in the emerging orthodoxy on global 
development. The idea of ‘decent work’ was set out as the ILO’s primary goal in 1999 by the 
then Director-General, Juan Somavía.4 It was central to a reorientation of the ILO’s main 
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focus, whereby they would seek to work more actively in tandem with other institutions of 
global governance. The theme of ‘decent work’ became the central concept for this new 
approach and was organised around four key objectives. These were the promotion of core 
labour standards at work, a focus on decent employment and income, enhancing social 
protection, and a commitment to social dialogue.5 The aim was to make ‘decent work’ a 
universal principle, which at the same time would be sufficiently flexible for it to be 
interpreted in relation to local context.6 As a result, the ILO’s definition of ‘decent work’ has 
remained rather imprecise and vague. It was reaffirmed as being at the core of the ILO’s 
focus in a key declaration in 2008.7 Within the ILO’s tripartite structure, employers have 
continued to be effective in preventing a more concrete definition or set of indicators from 
being adopted.8 Despite these limitations, ‘decent work’ as an idea has become embedded 
within the new ‘common sense’ on global development. 
 
In contrast to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreed in 2000, ‘decent work’ 
does feature in the SDGs.9 The SDGs could be argued to be relatively more transformative 
than the MDGs, given that they are a global agenda, rather than essentially a justification for 
North-South aid programmes.10 Goal 8 of the SDGs is to ‘promote inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, employment and decent work for all’.11 It is acknowledged in the SDGs 
that employment on its own is not a guarantee for poverty reduction. As Teichman argues, 
however, the SDGs themselves do not ‘suggest what policy measures would mitigate 
precarious, low-paid employment for women, youth, or other members of society’.12 
Moreover, in Africa the creation of meaningful jobs remains a real challenge despite the 
higher growth rates achieved in many parts of the continent since the early 2000s.13 
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Since the introduction of the Decent Work Agenda the EU has enhanced its co-operation with 
the ILO. In fact, it has been convincingly argued that ‘by aligning itself with the ILO’s 
broader decent work discourse and programmes, the European Commission acquired a 
distinctive role in global social governance’.14 In general, EU development policy has closely 
followed the emerging Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) since the early 2000s. The PWC 
seeks to overcome some of the limitations of the neoliberal development model that 
dominated policymaking during the 1980s. In particular, it acknowledges that neoliberalism 
had failed to create a sufficient number of productive employment opportunities in many 
countries in the Global South. The response within the PWC has been to focus on improving 
education so that there is an increased supply of more skilled labour in developing 
countries.15 
 
At the same time, as this article demonstrates, the PWC still retains a belief that trade 
liberalisation remains a key driver of development. What remains in question, therefore, is 
where the demand for this more highly skilled labour will come from. The ILO’s Decent 
Work Agenda is portrayed as the missing link. It becomes the key to ensuring that these 
qualitative improvements in the supply of labour will result in better quality employment 
opportunities. This is certainly the view of Guy Ryder, the current Director-General of the 
ILO, who in a recent statement argued that ‘decent work’ is the key to making progress on 
reducing both inequality and poverty.16 Similarly, the United Nations Development 
Programme has argued recently that the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda ‘and the human 
development framework are mutually reinforcing’.17 In the next section, I outline in more 
detail how the EU has sought to combine the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda with its negotiation 
of EPAs with ACP states. 
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Understanding ‘decent work’ in the EU’s trade and development policy 
 
The idea of promoting ‘decent work’ in the EU’s trade and development policy is part of the 
broader claim made since the beginning of the twenty-first century, that a social dimension to 
globalisation should guide Europe’s external relations. This was set out in a European 
Commission communication, which argued that the EU’s external policies should be 
concerned with ‘maximising the benefits of globalisation for all social groups in all its partner 
countries and regions’.18 Pascal Lamy, EU Trade Commissioner at the time, was one of the 
leading proponents of such a view. For example, in a speech in 2004 he suggested that: 
On globalisation, I think we face a two-fold task: first, of harnessing globalisation, of 
using this force to produce growth and jobs, and better regulation in the name of 
justice. And secondly, to ensure that we also ensure that development and more 
specifically the interests of developing countries are fully considered.19 
 
Thus, it was suggested that the values of the European social model should be promoted, if 
not directly exported, to other parts of the world. In terms of its trade strategy specifically, 
this has resulted in the EU focusing on the four pillars of the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda and 
in particular core labour standards.20 A 2006 communication from the Commission 
confidently asserted that this commitment would ensure that ‘trade liberalisation should help 
to achieve goals such as high growth, full employment, poverty reduction and the promotion 
of decent work’.21 
 
In terms of the EU’s relationship with ACP states, the Decent Work Agenda does feature in 
the Cotonou Agreement between the two parties, which was agreed in 2000. Most notably, 
Article 50 includes the commitment of all signatories to recognise the ILO’s core labour 
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standards and not to use them as a disguised form of trade protectionism.22 However, in 
reality this did not lead to significant outcomes in practice. In particular, the implementation 
of core labour standards by ACP states has not featured in political dialogue prompted by the 
Cotonou Agreement.23 What we have seen in more recent years, however, is an apparent 
increase in the commitment to the Decent Work Agenda in trade agreements concluded by 
the EU. The EPA signed with CARIFORUM includes a chapter on ‘social aspects’ and the 
more recent agreement concluded with the SADC grouping includes a ‘trade and sustainable 
development’ chapter. In both of these cases clear references are made to a commitment to 
the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda.24 The EU also highlight the role that Aid for Trade (AfT) 
can play in ensuring that trade agreements support the goals of the Decent Work Agenda. 
 
Alongside these policy developments in the EU’s external relations, a new way of 
conceptualising the EU as a global actor, ‘normative power Europe’ (NPE), entered the 
academic debate.25 It was suggested that we can identify five central norms inherent to the 
European project: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.26 
The NPE approach led to an increased focus on the importance of ideas in conceptualising 
the EU’s external relations; but at the same time, in doing so, it failed to provide an adequate 
appreciation of Europe’s material interests, which feature quite explicitly in the case of trade 
negotiations. Moreover, it puts too much faith in the rhetorical construction of the claims 
made by the EU itself as to its normative agenda. As Sjursen suggests, there is a danger that 
NPE analysis ‘leaves researchers vulnerable to the charge of being unable to distinguish 
between their own sympathy for the European project and their academic role as critical 
analysts’.27 Rather, the negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements with ACP states, 
demonstrates the EU’s overarching ideational commitment to neoliberalism, albeit in the 
form of the PWC. This ideational position means that in reality ‘the negotiation of EPAs 
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brings the EU’s material self-interest and the framing of its normative goals closer 
together.’28 
 
Hence, what we have witnessed in recent decades is the emergence of what should be more 
accurately understood as ‘corporate Europe’, rather than ‘social’, or ‘normative power’ 
Europe. In terms of this being reflected in the EU’s external relations, a clear turning point 
came with the publication by the European Commission of its ‘Global Europe’ strategy in 
2006.29  As Bieler makes clear, this new trade policy was primarily driven by a desire to 
boost the competitiveness of the EU economy, but at the same time it was also justified by 
the Commission in terms of the developmental benefits it would confer on its trade partners.30 
Given the neoliberal ideology at the heart of EU policymaking, trade is seen as a positive-
sum game where all participants benefit. As a result, European policymakers genuinely 
believe that they can ‘enhance Europe’s profits but also achieve ethical objectives associated 
with livelihood creation, employment, and trickle-down poverty elimination for poorer 
citizens in former colonies’.31 Hence, in the case of the negotiation of EPAs with ACP states, 
the EU’s ambitious strategy to include behind-the-border issues, rather than simply the 
liberalisation of trade in goods, represented ‘a concerted attempt to secure much ‘deeper’ 
roots for the neoliberal development model’.32 Although it has faced significant resistance to 
these more comprehensive EPAs, the Commission’s current trade strategy makes it clear that 
by including rendez-vous clauses in the most recently concluded EPAs, they remain firmly 
committed to the eventual inclusion of services and investment.33 
 
However, at the same time as the material interests of EU policy have become increasingly 
explicit, clauses on sustainable development, including a focus on the ILO’s Decent Work 
Agenda, have become common in recent EU trade agreements. By incorporating elements 
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from the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda into its external trade agreements, the EU is seeking to 
provide a rhetorical justification for an approach that is based on reciprocal trade 
liberalisation. The inclusion of AfT also forms part of this discursive process. As Langan and 
Scott argue, AfT has helped legitimate the reciprocal trade liberalisation that is central to 
EPAs despite the fact that ‘the development credentials of AfT measures implemented by the 
EU are doubtful’.34 In so doing, the EU hopes to assuage any critics who may highlight 
potential downsides to this approach. As a way of justifying its development policy this is not 
a new political strategy. As Langan reminds us, the EU has a long history of including 
specific measures within its relationship with ACP states to legitimate the developmental 
claims of its policies.35 
 
In essence then, there are significant problems with the concurrent rise of an agenda that is 
increasingly driven by the needs of European capital, and the commitment to ensuring the 
ILO’s Decent Work Agenda is also advanced. The main aim of this article, however, is not to 
focus on demonstrating the gap between rhetorical EU policy claims and the reality of the 
impact of EPAs in relation to the Decent Work Agenda. Prior research has already done an 
excellent job in this regard. For example, Orbie notes how the peculiar institutional set-up of 
the EU, whereby the Commission has competency for trade policymaking, means that it 
becomes more likely that any commitment to social norms will be secondary to material 
interests.36 Meanwhile, Langan in a more forceful and compelling critique, focuses on two 
specific economic sectors (poultry production and cut-flowers) to highlight the gap between 
the EU’s discourse on ‘decent work’ and the actual outcomes of its trade and development 
policies to Africa.37 Instead, I want to explore these tensions in relation to the response of 
trade unions to the EPA negotiations between the EU and SADC. In doing so I will assess the 
resultant challenges posed to transnational solidarity between the labour movement in Europe 
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and Southern Africa. The next section begins by considering the views of trade unions within 
the SADC region to the negotiation of an EPA with the EU. 
 
Trade Unions within SADC and EPA negotiations 
 
Member states of SADC have been negotiating a new trade agreement with the EU since 
EPA negotiations began with regional sub-groups of the larger ACP group in 2004.38 After 
missing the original deadline of December 31, 2007, negotiations finally came to a 
conclusion recently when an EPA was officially signed on June 10, 2016.39 Only seven 
SADC member states were involved in the EPA negotiations and hence the negotiating group 
is often referred to as SADC-Minus.40 As noted in the previous section, ‘decent work’ 
features in a number of the articles within the text of this EPA. In particular, Article 8 refers 
to ‘decent work for all as a key element of sustainable development for all countries and as a 
priority objective of international cooperation’.41 Meanwhile, Article 11 suggests that the 
signatories to the agreement may cooperate on ‘the trade aspects of labour or environmental 
policies in international fora, such as the ILO Decent Work Agenda and MEAs’.42 
 
Hence, we see the inclusion in the final agreement of the discourse aligned to the normative 
developmental agenda identified in the previous section. At the signing ceremony in Kasane, 
Botswana, the EU Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, reinforced this message in a 
speech where she argued that: 
It's a pragmatic deal based on a realistic collective assessment of everyone's relative 
strengths. As a result it will allow all six countries to shelter products and sectors from 
competition where needed in some cases forever, in other cases over long timelines. 
That makes it strongly pro-development. As do the provisions on workers' rights and 
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protecting the environment. The EPA favours sustainable development – not growth at 
all costs!43 
 
Similarly, during the ratification process of the SADC EPA in the European Parliament in 
September 2016, the MEP acting as chief rapporteur, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, suggested 
that ‘the language on human rights and sustainable development is one of the strongest that 
you will find in any EU agreement’.44 
 
African trade unions have felt rather marginalised within the process of the negotiations. The 
Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC) and a range of other civil 
society organisations have expressed frustration at their lack of involvement in the SADC 
EPA negotiations.45 To a large extent this is a product of the limited strength of many trade 
unions given the pervasiveness of authoritarian forms of nationalism across the region. Even 
in South Africa, where the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is in a 
formal alliance with the ruling African National Congress (ANC), there are significant 
limitations to its influence. It has ‘evolved from an organisation that pursued wider social 
transformation (social movement unionism) to one that increasingly prioritises collective 
bargaining’.46 South Africa does have institutional arrangements, such as the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) to give trade unions a formal 
platform in the policymaking process. However, it has been convincingly argued that on 
major policy decisions the ANC government has tended to ignore NEDLAC completely.47 
 
Nevertheless, given the focus on decent work and the broader developmental claims made by 
the EU, one might expect trade unions within the SADC-Minus group to be supportive of the 
recent signing of the EPA. However, over the last decade the labour movement across the 
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region has consistently remained critical of the potential impact of EPAs on workers. As a 
result, a recent statement by the African Regional Organisation of the International Trade 
Union Confederation (ITUC-Africa) continues to urge African governments not to sign 
EPAs. This statement encapsulates both the strength of feeling within the labour movement in 
the region and the central aspects of their critique of EPAs.48 It is argued that the inequitable 
structure of Africa’s trading relationship with Europe will only be perpetuated by the signing 
of EPAs. Despite the asymmetry built into the liberalisation agenda it emphasises that EPAs 
are ultimately free trade agreements. Contrary to the claims made by the European 
Commission, this statement by ITUC-Africa predicts that EPAs will result in a loss of tariff 
revenues, a loss of policy space which is needed to support domestic industry in the region, 
and an undermining of the processes of regional integration. 
 
Similar arguments have been made by individual trade union confederations in Southern 
Africa in response to the SADC EPA. COSATU has been particularly vocal in their 
opposition to the EPA negotiations. Speaking at a policy conference discussing ‘decent work’ 
organised by ITUC and ETUC, then General Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi was explicit in 
arguing that the relationship between contemporary trade negotiations and the Decent Work 
Agenda was not mutually compatible. He concluded that ‘trade liberalisation as proposed by 
the EU and the US in particular is bad news for a decent work agenda in the South’.49 After 
an interim EPA (iEPA) was agreed with SADC, COSATU put out a press release in March 
2008 supportive of both the South African and Namibian governments who were refusing to 
sign the iEPA.50 In 2011 in a speech to the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, Vavi 
accused the EU of ‘arm twisting-bully tactics to force African countries into an anti-
development trade agreement’.51 The case of South Africa is a rather unique one within the 
SADC region, as they had already signed a Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement 
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(TDCA) with the EU in 1999.52 Hence, the government’s aim was to resist any further 
opening up to European capital, whilst seeking improved access to the European market. 
COSATU’s opposition to the final EPA was less apparent than it had been during the earlier 
phase of the negotiations. Their main focus was on the use of export taxes, which are more 
limited under the terms of the SADC EPA. Export taxes are a way to increase the value of 
commodity exports and COSATU argued that they ‘are necessary in order to ensure that 
minerals are processed and jobs are created in SA’.53 
 
The Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) joined COSATU in contributing to a 
statement by a network of African trade unions on EPAs, which argued that the ‘rapid loss of 
government revenue will paralyse our governments’ abilities to invest in education, health 
and decent jobs’.54 In responding to a Presidential State of the Nation address, BFTU were 
also critical of the long-term consequences of signing an EPA with the EU, suggesting that 
the government failed ‘to place the link between diversification, economic strategy and trade 
policy’.55 Similar concerns were expressed by the National Union of Namibian Workers 
(NUNW) who, like COSATU in South Africa, supported their own government in refusing to 
sign the iEPA. NUNW’s then Secretary General, Evilastus Kaaronda, argued ‘that the 
proposed tariff reductions will cut very heavily into our labour intensive sectors leaving the 
majority of the already languishing Namibians further trapped in poverty’.56 
 
At the regional level, the impact of trade union resistance to EPAs has been significantly 
undermined by organisational limitations. The main platform for putting forward a regional 
voice, SATUCC, includes all the major national labour federations in the region. Ever since 
1995 when the decision was taken within SADC to form a new sector on ‘Employment and 
Labour’, SATUCC has been formally recognised as the regional voice of labour.57 However, 
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SATUCC’s influence is reflective of the relative strength and organisational capacity of many 
of the national trade union federations outside of South Africa.58 As with other attempts at co-
ordination of civil society actors in the region, SATUCC is limited by the fact that ‘regional 
agendas are not evident to the national members and their respective constituencies’.59 
SATUCC’s impact on the EPA negotiations is also reflective of the fact that different 
member states have been negotiating in different regional groupings. It first made a minor 
intervention into the debate on EPAs in 2006 when it published a brief statement outlining a 
number of criticisms of EPAs that were broadly in line with those made by COSATU.60 A 
much more detailed publication on the broader challenges faced by the region, as a result of 
the dominance of neoliberalism, was produced by SATUCC together with other key 
representatives of the regional labour movement. Reflecting on SADC’s external economic 
relations it was strongly argued that ‘the comprehensive liberalisation agenda, the IMF, the 
WTO, EPA's, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), regional trade agreements etc. 
should be stopped’.61 
 
In sum, the labour movement within the SADC region has been clear in its opposition to the 
negotiation of EPAs. This has been most effectively articulated within the national context, in 
particular by COSATU in South Africa, rather than through SATUCC at the regional level. 
They remain unconvinced by the claims made by the European Commission that EPAs will 
ensure the advancement of the Decent Work Agenda across the region. Given that the growth 
of PTAs has become central to the process of entrenching economic liberalisation, it is 
important that the international labour movement works together to resist their negotiation. In 
the next section, I consider the extent to which trade unions within Europe have supported the 
stance taken by their colleagues in the SADC region. 
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The SADC EPA negotiations, transnational labour solidarity and the prospects for 
‘decent work’ 
 
As the previous section has highlighted, African trade unions have been consistent in their 
resistance to the negotiation of the SADC EPA with the EU. As I argued earlier the Decent 
Work Agenda fits within the broader PWC global development orthodoxy. As such, it 
provides a framework of rights for workers that, whilst important, are often difficult to 
enforce. However, proponents of the PWC, such as the EU, also remain committed to 
comprehensive trade agreements based on reciprocal liberalisation. These seek to ensure that 
‘peripheral capitalist spaces become locked into new relationships of unequal exchange’.62 
The negative consequences of these agreements are often more significant for workers in the 
Global South and this has meant they have been more explicit in their opposition to the 
negotiation of free trade agreements in the first place. This contrasts with trade unions in the 
Global North who have tended to focus on ensuring that the agreements contain clauses that 
can ameliorate their overall impact on labour. As a result, this structural context makes 
solidarity between Northern and Southern trade unions difficult, but at the same time it is 
important to ensure that labour retains sufficient agency in the analysis.63 Hence, in the rest of 
this section I consider the position of European trade unions in response to the EU’s broader 
free trade agenda and the SADC EPA specifically. In doing so, I demonstrate the emergence 
of some more recent examples of solidarity between the labour movement in Europe and their 
counterparts in Africa. 
 
Historically, however, the prospects for effective transnational labour solidarity in response 
to the EU’s trade agenda have been limited. The trade union movement within Europe has 
displayed a rather ambivalent response to the EU’s negotiation of free trade agreements. For 
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example, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) gave rather mixed messages in 
response to the European Commission’s ‘Global Europe’ strategy. On the one hand, ETUC 
outlined ‘its disagreement with the proposed general reorientation of European trade policy in 
favour of an extremely aggressive liberalisation agenda in the developing countries’.64 On the 
other hand, at a conference organised by the Commission to discuss the new strategy in 
November 2006, the General Secretary of ETUC at the time, John Monks, outlined in a 
speech how he was not against PTAs in principle, but that the EU should ensure that an 
effective social dimension (including the promotion of ‘decent work’) should be included in 
future trade agreements.65 A similar stance was taken by the British Trades Union Congress 
(TUC) in 2007 when they called ‘for labour standards...to be included in all agreements with 
the same level of enforcement and support for their implementation as commercial clauses’.66 
Some European trade unions, particularly those representing workers in export-oriented 
sectors of the Germany economy, took a more overtly positive view of the ‘Global Europe’ 
trade agenda.67 In doing so, they are reflecting the material interests of their members ahead 
of the broader goals of international solidarity. 
 
In response to the particularly contentious EPA negotiations, both ETUC and the 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) jointly took the position that development 
should be put at the heart of the trade negotiations, and in particular they called for ‘strong, 
effective and operational social and labour chapters’.68 Thus, the European trade union 
movement took a reformist stance in arguing that the EU’s normative claims to the 
developmental potential of EPAs were not without foundation. The key argument being made 
was that labour rights must be effectively enshrined with the final EPA agreements. Such 
positioning was clearly at odds with the much bolder approach based on resistance, taken by 
Southern African trade unions in response to the SADC EPA negotiations, as discussed in the 
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previous section. In sum, Hilary convincingly concludes that the response of European trade 
unions to the EU’s free trade agenda was ‘at best to lobby for the inclusion of social 
conditionalities within the agreements as a means of mitigating their most damaging 
effects’.69 
 
Partly as a result of being alerted to the more immediate dangers to workers from both the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiations with Canada and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between the EU and the 
United States, some European trade unions have recently begun to develop a more explicitly 
solidaristic position with their Southern colleagues. Trade unions were not at the forefront of 
the initial critique of these trade negotiations within Europe. However, as Dierckx argues, 
both TTIP and CETA, and in particular their inclusion of protections for investors, have since 
2014 led to a re-think in the European labour movement.70 Even trade unions that were 
previously supportive of free trade have adopted a more critical stance, such as IG Metall, 
which represents German metalworkers in a range of sectors including the car industry.71 In 
the specific case of the SADC EPA, the TUC published a letter urging MEPs not to ratify the 
agreement, because it ‘will restrict the policy space of governments...cause a significant loss 
of revenue from tariffs and undermine fundamental labour rights’.72 The letter also made a 
direct reference of support for ITUC-Africa, who in a recent statement provided a damning 
assessment of EPAs arguing that overall they ‘will only make it harder for Africa to achieve 
the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals’.73 
 
The recent change in the stance taken by European trade unions is also related to the 
realisation that there are significant limitations to the strength of the sustainable development 
chapters within EPAs. In its submission to the European Commission’s public consultation 
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on the future of the Cotonou Agreement, ITUC argued that the ‘monitoring of efforts 
concerning labour rights should be conducted in a more thorough, systematic and inclusive 
manner’.74 In the case of the SADC EPA specifically, the robustness of the inclusion of 
references to the Decent Work Agenda in the agreement was tested almost immediately after 
the final round of trade negotiations had ended. In October 2014 ETUC and ITUC 
demonstrated their solidarity with trade unions in Swaziland who had been banned by the 
monarchy. The ban was an explicit contravention of ILO Convention 87, which guarantees 
freedom of association and the right of workers to organise. ETUC sent a letter to Catherine 
Ashton, then the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which 
noted that the actions in Swaziland contravened the sustainable development clauses of the 
SADC EPA and urged the European Commission to use diplomatic pressure on the regime in 
Swaziland.75 Eventually in May 2015 the Trade Union Congress of Swaziland was 
recognised by the regime but as a recent report suggests it is still the case that ‘trade unions 
face massive restrictions, and workers who want to join unions or participate in union activity 
have frequently been intimidated and harassed’.76 
 
Hence, in the case of the SADC EPA, it is only belatedly that trade union federations in both 
Europe and Southern Africa have begun to adopt a united position of resistance.  From the 
European side this appears to have been driven by a realisation that the clauses in the SADC 
EPA, on the Decent Work Agenda, contain no provisions for effective monitoring or 
enforcement. This position of solidarity was encapsulated in a joint letter sent to MEPs in 
August 2016.77 This urged them to vote down the agreement when it went to the European 
Parliament for ratification the following month. The letter expressed concern that: 
...the EPA does not have a strong Sustainable Development chapter that would enable 
us to put forward social, labour and environmental concerns stemming from the 
 19 
implementation of the Agreement. In particular, the chapter does not explicitly establish 
monitoring bodies with the participation of trade unions, and satisfactory procedures for 
the enforcement of the sustainable development provisions are lacking.78 
 
In sum, the main argument being developed here is that despite some limited recent progress 
in the strength of transnational labour solidarity in response to EPA negotiations by the 
European trade union movement, the reality is that the global development orthodoxy 
outlined earlier remains pervasive. This orthodoxy suggests that the inclusion of the Decent 
Work Agenda in trade agreements will ensure that workers across the globe will see 
improvements in the four central objectives identified by the ILO. This article outlines why 
trade unions should resist, and not legitimate EPAs with ACP states. Otherwise they will be 
sanctioning a set of agreements that will ultimately ensure the ‘lock-in’ of a liberalisation 
agenda and domestic regulatory environments across Africa that serve the interests of 
transnational capital rather than labour.79 
 
Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, this article has highlighted some of the limitations of the Decent Work Agenda 
given the structural context of continuing attempts to deepen the process of trade 
liberalisation. Trade unions have a choice to make in the strategies they pursue in this regard. 
They can act as legitimators of trade policy (as has often been the case with respect to the 
trade union movement in the EU) or they can adopt a counter-hegemonic role by resisting 
EPAs and advancing a more transformative agenda.80 As such, a set of common demands 
around which trade unions can unite, is a vital part of developing a more effective counter-
hegemonic approach. One recent example is the ‘Futures Commission’ project organised by 
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the Southern Initiative on Globalisation and Trade Union Rights. In its first publication, 
Bieler sketches out the central ideas that could form the basis of an alternative ‘fair’ trade 
system, whereby ‘a range of joint demands may be feasible around the re-assertion of 
national sovereignty and against the increasing structural power of transnational capital’.81 
 
If the NPE view was correct and normative interests, such as the Decent Work Agenda, were 
really at the heart of EPAs then why is it that African trade unions, as I have demonstrated in 
the case of the SADC EPA, have remained consistently opposed to them? The answer lies in 
the material interests and core neoliberal assumptions that are central to the EU’s trade 
agenda. Trade unions across the Global South have refused to accept the inclusion of social 
clauses in free trade agreements as a sufficient mechanism for protection from the material 
impacts of trade liberalisation. This view is neatly encapsulated by two COSATU researchers 
who argue that ‘core labour standards are necessary, but not sufficient, to prevent a race to 
the bottom as a result of more open economies’.82 
 
As I have argued in this article, this is a view that the European labour movement has been 
slow to acknowledge. In contrast, as Hilary notes, the view of the labour movement in Africa 
‘is shared by European alter-globalisation organisations active on trade policy issues, as well 
as by social movements and the broader mass of civil society groups in the Global South’.83 
Nevertheless, as I have demonstrated, in recent years European trade unions have become 
more critical of the EPA negotiations. It is to be hoped these examples of European solidarity 
with African trade unions continue to be built upon, as the EU’s desire to secure deeper trade 
agreements with Africa remains a part of its broader trade strategy. 
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